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Since the height of the Eurozone crisis, a number of reforms have been pursued to stabilise the economic
situation in states using the single currency. In an interview with EUROPP’s editor Stuart Brown,
Jacques Melitz outlines why the Eurozone is still suffering from two key problems – the European
Central Bank’s inability to engage in proper open market operations and the lack of joint-
responsibility for the banking system. He argues that, given the inflexibility of Germany, the
discontented Eurozone members should give serious consideration to the possibility of creating a
‘second euro’ as an alternative.
Although the initial crisis has been alleviated to some extent, there are still substantial
difficulties within the Eurozone. Do we require more radical reforms of the single currency than have
already been implemented?
There are two major problems. The first problem is the European Central Bank’s inability to engage in proper open
market operations: the kind of open market operations which are discussed in textbooks, where the central bank
just buys or sells at its own initiative. This power does not exist under the Maastricht Treaty – there are so-called
open market operations, but they refer to refinancing operations of banks that depend on the banks’ willingness to
lend to their customers, and in some special cases they refer to purchases of securities of particular governments in
difficulty andwhich then have to be sterilised. So basically we have a European Central Bank which can’t engage in
ordinary open market operations. This is a very great defect.
The other problem is that there’s no joint-responsibility for the solvency of the banking system. It’s true that some
movement has been made in this direction with respect to the proposed Banking Union, however this has not gone
nearly far enough. It simply involves the introduction of common rules and common supervision, but there has been
no establishment yet of the essential Single Bank Resolution Fund under discussion to prop up insolvent banks. So
on these two counts we certainly still require some important reforms.
You have argued that one such reform might be the creation of a ‘second euro’. How would this system
work and what are some of the key advantages?
My argument is that the discontented members of the Eurozone should consider very seriously the creation of a
second euro. Very simply, this would mean that there would be an additional central bank. Alongside the European
Central Bank, there are already a number of different central banks in the European Union including the Bank of
England, the Danish central bank and the Swedish central bank. So there would be still another one and this central
bank would issue a second euro for the dissatisfied members, different from the euros issued by the European
Central Bank. This currency would fluctuate in value and there would be an exchange rate between one euro and
the other euro.
The basic advantage of this system is that the second euro could be constructed in a better manner than the
previous euro from the discontented members’ point of view. This new central bank would be empowered to engage
in proper open market operations and could therefore engage in expansionary monetary policy in order to increase
aggregate demand in its own zone. And there would be a single resolution fund which would cover the insolvency of
any particular section of the banking system.
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In addition, of course, this would give the opportunity for an adjustment of the price of goods in the Southern
periphery states. German goods are currently exceptionally under-priced and the second euro would allow for some
form of price adjustment to take place. Moreover, while Germany would still carry enormous weight in determining
monetary policy in its area governed by the European Central Bank, it would have no power over the other central
bank so the monetary policy of the discontented members could be determined independently of Germany.
Would getting agreement from EU states to pursue such a system be feasible?
Well my argument is that if the discontented members of the Eurozone look ahead there is every indication that they
are not going to get any German accommodation in the long-run. This is a long-run problem. Their problems are
pretty serious right now and if the prospects are poor for the long-run future, then it would be better to bear the cost
of a divorce. True it would be messy – divorces are messy – but there are times when it is better to simply bite the
bullet.
One quite significant element is that the willingness to head in this direction would represent a very important turning
point in negotiations with Germany. It would confirm to Germany the implications of its current inflexibility and it
would be confronted with the fact that the result may be the monetary union splitting into two with an inevitable
depreciation of its goods relative to the other members.
For more information on this subject, Jacques Melitz has also written an article on the topic here
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